Sandbox Isolation Primitives

Agents breach cgroup v2's resource limits in ways traditional workloads never do.

Dropping Linux capabilities shrinks the attack surface attackers can exploit.

Hardware isolation replaces software policy for untrusted AI-generated code.

AI agents executing untrusted code need isolation beyond what traditional container runtimes offer.

Layering filesystem controls stops AI-generated code from reaching files it shouldn't.

AI pipeline images need layered scanning beyond standard container tools.

AI agents violate Docker's security assumptions and demand stronger isolation.

AI agents need seccomp profiles built from actual syscall traces, not generic defaults.

Which open source Docker scanner actually catches the flaws that matter.

AI agents write code at runtime that containers weren't designed to isolate.

Catch vulnerable container images before they reach production.

Trivy's supply-chain attack exposes why scanner provenance matters more than features for AI teams.

Making the main executable randomizable closes the final gap in memory defenses.

Execution servers need isolation that API proxies don't, and most teams don't know the difference.

Namespaces control visibility, not security, and that distinction matters for container escapes.