Marcus Oyelaran

The isolation mechanism you choose sets both your security boundary and performance ceiling.

Enterprises need sandboxes built for untrusted AI code, not retrofitted containers.

Prompt injection now gives attackers a direct path to remote code execution inside AI agent systems.

Filesystem boundaries for agents require explicit path allowlists and task-specific storage quotas.

Default-deny network access is the only defense that survives prompt injection attacks.

Different isolation models require profilers that live inside the guest sandbox itself.

Snapshots cut sandbox restart time from seconds to milliseconds.

Freezing and resuming sandbox state cuts long-running agent failures in half.

AI agents need sandboxes that boot in milliseconds, not seconds.

Dropping Linux capabilities shrinks the attack surface attackers can exploit.

AI agents need seccomp profiles built from actual syscall traces, not generic defaults.

Which open source Docker scanner actually catches the flaws that matter.

API design matters more than infrastructure when integrating sandboxes with code agents.

Runtime tool calls replace code review, shifting where security actually happens.

How AI agents break traditional secrets management and what to fix before production.

Checkov catches AI-generated infrastructure misconfigurations before deployment.